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Introduction: 
It is very difficult to know the impact of the MDG paradigm on poverty reduction. On 
one hand, international and even national measurements of poverty are ambiguous, 
arbitrary and contested, even in the best of cases such as China and India. Despite the 
façade of precise estimates, we do not really know what has been happening to global 
poverty all things considered, particularly when measured against rising costs for 
education and health care, which are mostly not factored into poverty measures for 
technical reasons. On the other hand, the mechanisms by which the MDG paradigm 
might have effected poverty reduction are not at all clear. The recent literature on the 
impact of aid on growth offers little useful insight given that it largely ignores the major 
global structural processes that condition the impact of aid flows, such as those reflected 
by global balance of payments asymmetries. Moreover, the emphasis in the MDGs on 
absolute measures and the implicit bias towards targeting quite possibly undermine 
poverty reduction in many contexts, particularly if poverty is primarily considered as an 
outcome of dynamic processes of social stratification and subordination.  
This paper argues that the MDGs should be replaced by a re-politicisation of the 
mainstream development agenda, together with a genuine revival of emphasis on 
universalistic modes of social policy as viable policy options for dealing simultaneously 
with poverty and inequality. Serious consideration of the erosion of decent employment 
and wages and the increasing segmentation of social security systems throughout the 
developing world is particularly needed if we are to truly embrace a pro-poor agenda, i.e. 
not one that merely reduces absolute poverty regardless of inequality, but one that 
actually promotes equitable sharing without double standards.  
 
I 
At the outset, the impact of the MDG paradigm on poverty reduction, here defined as 
income poverty as per Goal One of the MDGs, is very difficult to assess because poverty 
reduction itself is very difficult to measure. The international estimates provided by the 
World Bank are highly contested even though they are the main data relied upon by the 
leading international organisations spearheading the promotion of the MDGs. This 
received much attention through the debate between Pogge and Reddy (2002; 2005; 
2006) and Ravallion (2002; 2003), which was further articulated by Wade (2004) among 
others. Much of the contention relates to the way that the purchasing-power-parity (PPP) 
poverty line has been calculated and standardised. Together with other considerations, 
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Pogge and Reddy (2005) conclude that the World Bank‟s estimates of the magnitude, 
distribution or trend of global income poverty are neither meaningful nor reliable. 
This is just one example of the contention underlying the façade of precision in 
the field of poverty studies. Given the wide variety of fairly arbitrary assumptions and 
choices that are required in order to first choose a line and then to apply this line to 
presumably-accurate survey data in ways that are broadly consistent, accurate and 
comparable across time and regions, it is no surprise nor exaggeration that poverty 
estimates themselves are quite arbitrary, even before considering World Bank PPP 
adjustments. Saith (2005) eloquently synthesises the perils, although practitioners of 
poverty measurement have acknowledged the pitfalls for decades. Indeed, in the opening 
pages of his poverty measurement manual, Ravallion (1992: 2-3) admits that poverty 
lines are arbitrary, albeit he argues that even arbitrarily-chosen lines nonetheless allow for 
comparison and evaluation so long as they can be accurately adjusted over time.  
However, the issue of adjustment leads to the classic quandary that we simply do 
not know whether poverty trends over time reflect actual changes or else errors of 
adjustment. The quandary is all the more problematic given that the incomes of 
populations in poor countries tend to be densely clustered around a typical line, resulting 
in an extreme sensitivity of poverty estimates to small adjustment to the line, whether or 
not these are accurate. For example, Székely et al (2000) apply sensitivity analysis to 
household survey data from 17 Latin American countries in the 1990s. By varying the 
poverty line parameters within reasonable boundaries, they estimated poverty rates as 
lying anywhere from 12.7 percent to 65.8 percent of the total population. Moreover, the 
ranking of countries with respect to poverty rates was also highly sensitive to their 
exercise. Hussain (2003) demonstrates a similar point with respect to urban poverty in 
China regarding both sensitivity and rank orderings across Chinese provinces. Helwege 
and Birch (2007: 6) note that, ironically, „the institutions that generate poverty data are 
well aware of how methodological choices affect poverty estimates. They simply have 
not established standardized approaches to measuring poverty.‟ 
Moreover, poverty trends can differ depending on where or how a line is drawn. 
For instance, poverty was decreasing in China from 1998 to 2000 according to the 
unreasonably-low official poverty line (i.e. the one often cited in World Bank 
publications in the early 2000s), but it was rising according to the more reasonable 
absolute poverty line calculated by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (Hussain 
2001, cited in Fischer 2005: 96-99). Similarly, based on their efforts to correct 
inconsistencies in Indian survey data from 1999-2000, Himanshu and Sen (2004a; 2004b) 
conclude that there had been little poverty reduction in India in the 1990s, contrary to the 
dominant consensus. Deaton and Kozel (2005: 117) contend that such claims are „frankly 
political‟ and that there is good evidence that poverty fell. However, further findings 
presented by Himanshu (2007), based on new data from 2004-2005, confirmed his earlier 
results for the 1990s. Likewise, in their assessment of alternative poverty estimates from 
the World Bank and the United Nations for Latin America, Helwege and Birch (2007) 
advise caution in interpreting trends from any of these data.  
 Our ability to track poverty trends over time is critically based on our presumption 
that we can accurately measure all of the changing cost factors faced by poor households 
together with their changing patterns of livelihood and consumption, in contexts of often 
rapid social and economic change. Notably, the World Bank recently revised upwards its 
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estimates for global PPP poverty rates, including an upward adjustment of about 40 
percent for China. This was based on new and improved cost of living data from 2005, 
which revealed a substantially higher cost of living for the poor in developing countries 
than was previously estimated from older data. However, Chen and Ravallion (2008) 
stress that, although poorer than previously thought, the world was no less successful in 
poverty reduction. They reach this conclusion simply by deflating the new PPP poverty 
lines by the official consumer price indices of each country back to 1981 (ibid: 14-15). In 
other words, the fact that the resultant trends were the same as before is merely an 
artefact of their assumption that the source of error was the same in 1981 as it was 2005. 
In so doing, they completely sidestep the question of whether the poor faced greater cost 
of living increases than suggested by the general consumer prices indices, which is quite 
possible given the notable increases in inequality in many countries over the same 
period.
1
 Thus, while Chen and Ravallion provide a politically-convenient narrative, many 
intractable problems remain lost in past surveys.  
Perhaps the most fundamental Achilles Heel of the income poverty approach is 
that education and health costs are mostly not included into the calculation of poverty 
lines. The exclusion is for technical reasons, given that they constitute large and highly 
irregular expenditure items across households and across time. However, they are 
included in the expenditures of surveyed households. This renders the comparison of 
poverty rates very difficult even across households, let alone across regions with different 
provisioning systems or else across time when the costing and supply of education or 
health care changes. Notably, increasing costs of education or health care, or else 
increasing school enrolments in schools that charge fees, would be invisible to most 
conventional poverty measures even though they effectively raise the poverty line for a 
large proportion of households, leading to an important source of underestimation of 
poverty rates in such contexts. This weakness is recognised in some of the literature, but 
it is also generally sidestepped in the same literature (e.g. see Ravallion 1992: 12, 28).  
The innovative work by van Doorslaer et al (2005) is one exception in this regard. 
Merely by deducting catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for health care from the 
expenditures of households surveyed in eleven low and middle-income countries in Asia 
(most surveys taken around 2000), they show that poverty rates across Asia increased 
from 19.3 percent to 22 percent, or an increase of 78 million people. Notably, this does 
not take into account the repressed expenditure of poor people who would have otherwise 
spent more on necessary health care were it not for lack of funds, which is a problem that 
the authors consider but cannot measure.  
As insightful as this work is, it is nonetheless based on insights from single 
surveys taken at one particular point in time. The results therefore offer no indication on 
how these considerations might alter our perception of trends over time, particularly in 
cases where education and health care costs have gone through substantial increase. For 
instance, falling income poverty rates in China since the beginning of the reform period 
do not factor into consideration the parallel shift from free to very expensive health care. 
More specifically, while general consumer prices in China remained more or less 
unchanged between 1997 and 2004, tuition fees and health care services were extremely 
inflationary, especially in some of the poorest western provinces such as Qinghai, where 
prices for health care services more than quadrupled (Fischer 2007: 128). By ignoring 
                                                 
1
 See Günther and Grimm (2007) for a discussion of this point in the case of Burkina Faso. 
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such dramatically changing price structures (as do Chen and Ravallion 2008), we simply 
do not know to what degree the appearance of improving poverty rates simply represents 
increasing relative prices for these essential services not included in the poverty line.  
It is in this sense that the exclusive focus on conventional absolute income 
poverty measures in Goal One of the MDGs can be said to be biased against 
universalistic modes of social policy. A movement towards free education or health care 
financed through progressive taxation would not necessarily appear as decreasing income 
poverty even though it would lower the effective poverty line for households previously 
paying user fees. Similarly, it is difficult to calibrate poverty rates in any meaningful way 
across countries with very different provisioning systems, such as between Cuba with its 
free health care and education, and Vietnam, which had the greatest reliance on out-of-
pocket payments among the Asian cases studied by van Doorslaer et al (2005). Indeed, in 
the latter case, much of the appearance of rising incomes might actually signify 
deteriorating social wealth. 
 
II 
The other side of the question on the poverty impact of the MDG paradigm is that the 
mechanisms by which MDGs might have effected poverty reduction are simply not clear. 
Notably, the major episodes that account for a large part of the commonly-cited absolute 
income poverty reduction over the last several decades had little to do with MDGs, e.g. 
China in the 1980s or the financially-driven global economic bubble from 2002 to 2008. 
Similarly, the mechanisms that could continue to drive poverty reduction now that this 
bubble has burst are even less clear and the MDGs provide little guidance. Hope is placed 
on the aid system. However, much of the recent literature on the impact of aid on growth 
and poverty offers little useful insight given that attention is rarely given to the major 
global structural processes that condition the impact of aid flows, such as the position of 
aid within global balance of payments asymmetries or the relationship of aid to national 
industrialisation strategies, as argued in Fischer (2009).  
On this last point, there is no sense in discussing whether aid is good or bad for 
development, or whether more or less aid is required for development, outside of a much 
broader understanding of what has been required for development to happen, namely 
industrialisation and large sunk investments in urban and other infrastructure. These in 
turn usually require that developing countries run trade deficits rather than surpluses. In 
an earlier developmental epoch, aid was understood as enabling poor countries to cover 
such trade deficits, as best represented by the critical role of aid in the balance of 
payments of South Korea well into the 1970s. The recent exceptionality of China might 
seem to counter this rule, although its replication or sustainability is questionable if only 
because the world economy has probably already reached its limits of disequilibria.  
The role of aid must be considered in this light, because aid will have very 
different macroeconomic implications depending on whether a receiving country is in 
current account deficit or surplus. Moreover, even if a country is in deficit, aid would 
presumably have very different effects on growth depending on whether the deficit (or 
surplus) is due to productive investment and accumulation, or simply due to terms of 
trade and other contractionary shocks, or to austerity and structural adjustment 
programmes. Indeed, many of the arguments on aid and growth are rendered trivial by 
their lack of consideration of these broader structural considerations.  
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Similarly, it is meaningless to argue that large increases in aid would produce 
better development (i.e. Sachs 2005) without examining the international mechanisms set 
in place to deliver aid, which for much of the last three decades have encouraged a 
haemorrhaging of human, physical and financial resources from poor to rich countries. 
The same can be said of arguments that aid effectiveness could be improved by 
improving incentive mechanisms within poor countries (i.e. Easterly 2006), irrespective 
of the globalised incentive mechanisms that play a strong role in disorienting local 
incentives. The frivolity of these arguments is best highlighted by the massive US current 
account deficit, many times the size of the annual aid budget of the OECD countries and 
largely financed by the developing world.  
More pertinent is the fact that, in the midst of a crushing depression in the 1980s 
and into much of the 1990s, Africa was experiencing net outflows of capital that far 
exceeded any inflows of aid. Collier (2007: 91-93) discusses this point to some extent but 
does not place it within the context of the systemic shifts in global economic structures 
and ideologies that produced these outcomes, in particular the 1982 debt crisis and 
subsequent structural adjustments. Similar obfuscations are committed throughout the 
cross-country regression literature on aid; data from two entirely different epochs of 
development are usually merged together without differentiating the radically different 
structured settings in which aid might or might not work.  
It is in this sense that the MDG paradigm has lost sight of the major global 
structural processes that have been shaping development up to the present. A critical shift 
occurred in the late 1970s, after which the US economy decidedly became the world‟s 
greatest debtor and aid flows became a trickle in comparison to successive waves of 
capital flows from poor to rich countries. Aid has since been futile in producing any 
significant degree of net global redistribution.  
 
III 
In terms of what should replace the MDGs after 2015, it is important to recall three main 
criticisms of the MDGs; that they do not pay attention to employment or inequality, and 
that they depoliticise development debates.
2
 Of these three, de-politicisation underlies the 
weakness of the MDGs with respect to employment and inequality.  
 The reasons for this might seem semantic, but they are not. They are rooted in the 
fact that policy choices are very political, even though they are often couched in 
seductively technocratic terms. De-politicisation therefore often serves to hide underlying 
agendas. Moreover, the emphasis in the MDGs on absolute measures and the implicit bias 
towards targeting predisposes the MDG agenda to be co-opted by a particular orthodox 
policy paradigm. Underlying this has been a subtle shift in the implied meaning of 
universalism, from integrated and de-commoditised forms of social security and service 
provisioning financed indirectly and progressively, to universal coverage regardless of 
how such coverage provided or financed. De-politicisation renders such shifts hegemonic 
by stifling debate on alternatives.   
Social policy is paramount in this regard. As argued by Mkandawire (2005), 
social policies are fundamentally political exercises given that they are the basis of 
instituting citizenship rights and articulating the main mechanisms of integration and 
segregation within societies. Moreover, social policies comprise some of the most 
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 For elaboration on these three and many other critiques, see Saith (2006). 
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powerful tools for addressing poverty, vulnerability and inequality. Nonetheless, 
Mkandawire highlights the irony that, historically, poverty alleviation was most 
successful when it was not necessarily the primary focus of social policies, as opposed to 
other priorities such as late industrialisation, state consolidation, demand stabilisation, or 
political cohesion.  
Within social policy, the choice of provisioning modes is critical given that 
targeted modes can lead to a variety of perverse outcomes. The errors of under-coverage 
and leakage are the most commonly discussed. Indeed, precision in poverty measurement 
becomes ever more crucial precisely when social policy regimes shift towards greater 
selectivity, such as under the social safety net approach of the World Bank. However, as 
argued by Mkandawire (2005), poor countries also have among the least administrative 
capacity to be able to target precisely.   
Other perverse outcomes of targeting reside in its political and social implications. 
Targeting usually entrenches segmentation in provisioning systems, which in turn 
reinforces social and economic stratification by removing middle classes and their 
political voice from the services that are supplied to and accessed by the poor. The 
resulting political economy paradox was best expressed by Richard Titmuss (although 
often attributed to Amartya Sen), that the targeting of services to the poor usually results 
in poor services. Insofar as we view poverty as fundamentally rooted in dynamic social 
processes of stratification, differentiation and subordination, these implications are 
potentially very counterproductive for any long term strategy of poverty reduction.  
Nonetheless, the MDG paradigm is well served by targeting given its focus on 
absolute indicators (whether in income, health or education) rather than relative (i.e. 
inequality) indicators. For instance, it is relatively easy to raise school enrolments, but 
much more difficult to raise the quality of schooling, particularly in ways that would 
significantly alter the employment trajectories of students. The last objective is especially 
difficult to induce when increased enrolments are achieved in stigmatized and lower 
quality schools designated for poor people within a segmented education system. Indeed, 
if the quantity and quality of employment and the level of wages faced by the poor are 
not addressed by poverty reduction strategies, the expectations raised by educational 
improvements might lead to frustration and alienation in the medium term.  
This has precisely been the dilemma of the much-lauded Progresa/Oportunidades 
conditional cash transfer programme in Mexico. The programme has shown some degree 
of success in raising consumption levels, certain health outcomes, and school attendance 
and enrolment rates (Skoufias 2005). These results were obtained with relatively low 
operational expenses, in large part because the programme was implemented through an 
already well-established network of clinics and schools servicing the targeted rural 
populations (distinct from the subsidised network servicing the urban middle classes). 
However, even its proponents, such as Levy (2006), admit that increased coverage was 
achieved at the cost of lower quality within this overstretched and segmented network. 
Notably, the programme had no impact on the academic performance of students or on 
their later local employment prospects. Thus, while it had a positive impact on absolute 
human development indicators, it did so at the cost of entrenching the segmentation of 
provisioning systems and possibly accentuated social stratification as a result.   
The obvious rejoinder is that, in the short or even medium term, universalistic 
modes of social policy would be impossible to achieve within the starkly unequal social 
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context of Mexico or most other developing countries. Hence, we must do what we can 
now. However, we must also ask why universalistic social policy is not even on the 
agenda as an explicit long term goal. For instance, the recent World Development Report 
2004 on services makes no explicit reference to universalism. Instead, it offers a strong 
endorsement of New Public Management approaches to social policy, promoting choice 
and client power through various mixtures of decentralisation, marketisation, user fees 
and vouchers, in most cases implicitly based on targeting. Yet, as argued by Dunleavy et 
al (2006), even in rich countries with well-developed administrative capacities, the policy 
complexity introduced by such approaches generally led to a reduction in citizen 
competence and the tide has since turned in „leading-edge‟ countries. More importantly, 
insofar as we recognise high levels of inequality as problematic, the censor of 
universalistic social policy from mainstream agendas implies abandoning at the outset 
one of our most powerful tools for dealing with inequality.   
 
Conclusion 
In sum, the challenge of the MDG paradigm does not lie in measuring the impact of 
poverty reduction, but in seriously re-engaging with development debates about how to 
create genuinely redistributive structures and institutions at national and global levels. 
This is a political exercise given that it cannot be resolved through technocratic solutions, 
but requires choices to be made about the types of societies we wish to inhabit and how 
we wish to treat each other within and across these societies. These choices are being 
made in any case under the depoliticising guise of the MDGs, which reinforce tendencies 
towards targeting and segmentation in the name of urgency and expediency. These 
choices need to be re-politicised, ideally within the domestic sphere of developing 
countries themselves, as a means to break out of the TINA hangover (i.e. „There Is No 
Alternative‟). Moreover, there is also a case to be made that such re-politicisation needs 
to be backed up by a genuine revival, in research and in practice, of universalistic modes 
of social policy as viable means of dealing simultaneously with processes of poverty and 
inequality. This is because real political choice is very difficult to cultivate within a 
context of starkly unequal and segregated societies.   
In other words, we should not fool ourselves into thinking à la Martin Wolf that 
we are Keynesian simply because we support aid or expansionary spending. More 
fundamentally, we need to address the erosion of decent employment and wages and the 
increasing segmentation of social security systems throughout the developing world if we 
are to truly embrace a pro-poor agenda, i.e. not one that merely reduces absolute poverty 
regardless of inequality (as per the definition of pro-poor growth by Besley and Cord 
2005), but one that actually promotes equitable sharing without double standards. This 
has been a struggle in both North and South alike, although it is important to recognise 
that rich countries benefit from a certain degree of hypocrisy at the international level. In 
good times and especially in bad, they allow themselves a range of macroeconomic and 
social policies that have been generally ostracised by the leading international financial 
institutions from the range of permissible development options that poor countries can 
choose from. Hence, perhaps the guiding dictum for the next incarnation of the MDGs 
should not be „Make Poverty History (Part Two),‟ but rather, „Do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you.‟  
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It is very difficult to know the impact of the MDG paradigm on poverty reduction. On 
one hand, poverty measurements are ambiguous, arbitrary and contested, even in the best 
of cases such as China and India. On the other hand, the mechanisms by which MDGs 
might have effected poverty reduction are not at all clear, particularly in light of the 
major global structural processes that condition the impact of aid flows. Moreover, the 
emphasis in the MDGs on absolute measures and the implicit bias towards targeting quite 
possibly undermine poverty reduction in many contexts. Hence, this paper argues that the 
MDGs should be replaced by a re-politicisation of the mainstream development agenda, 
together with a genuine revival of emphasis on universalistic modes of social policy as 
viable means of dealing simultaneously with poverty and inequality.   
 
